Untying the Web of Network Elements: How the FCC Should Regulate Operational Support Systems by Lowinger, Brian M.
UNTYING THE WEB OF NETWORK ELEMENTS: How THE
FCC SHOULD REGULATE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
Brian M. Lowinger
Just as the weakest link in a chain determines the
strength of the entire chain, so does the worst-perform-
ing component of a telecommunications service deter-
mine the quality of that service.
1
INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to get through the day without
hearing about the revolution occurring in the
world of telecommunications. Possibly the area
where changes are most expected is the local tele-
phone service arena ("local exchange"). While
statutory and regulatory precedent have ruled
that the era of a monopolized local exchange is
dead, reality proves otherwise.
Following the implementation of the Telecom-
munications Act of 19962 ("1996 Act"), which
sought to expand competition in the telecommu-
1 Teleport Communications Group, Model Performance
Parity Measures for Facilities-Based Competition Introduction (vis-
ited Feb. 20, 1998), <http://www.tcg.com/tcg/regulate/
whitePaper/mppm.html> [hereinafter Teleport Comm. Group].
2 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
3 See Tim Wilson, OSS Unbundling Issue Hampers RBOCs,
COMMUNICATIONS WEEK, Aug. 4,1997, at T17. Problems with
accessing OSS are causing concern among many communica-
tions service providers seeking to compete in the local ex-
change market.
4 See Petition for Expedited Rulemaking of the LCI Int'l
Telecom Corp. and Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n, RM 9109,
Prt No DA97-1211 at 1 (May 30, 1997) [hereinafter LCI
CompTel Petition]. An incumbent local exchange carrier's
("ILEC") OSS are key elements that provide vital service
functions, including: pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning,
maintenance, repair, billing, traffic data, real-time network
control, and forecasting of customer needs.
5 See GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, GLOSSARY OF TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS TERMS 1-9 (1997). Interconnection is the connec-
tion between two telecommunications carriers' networks, or
the connection of telephone equipment to the telephone
network. Id. [hereinafter GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES]
6 See IEC Web Proforums, The Operational Support System
Tutorial: Traditional Systems, § 2 (visitedJan. 19, 1998) <http:/
/www.webproforum.com/manchester/topic02.html> [here-
nications industry, no issue proved as surprisingly
important to the development of local competi-
tion as operations support systems ("OSS").3
OSS are computer database systems used by
communications service providers to store and
provide information related to customer subscrip-
tion, maintenance and repair, billing, service re-
quests, and many other services. 4 OSS were not
originally designed to be accessible via intercon-
nection 5 by competitors6 to an incumbent local
exchange carrier 7 ("ILEC"). Instead, they were
created for the ILEC's own internal use. The 1996
Act alters the way ILECs employ OSS by requiring
them to provide competitive local exchange carri-
ers ("CLECs") 8 nondiscriminatory access to their
OSS. 9
CLECs depend on OSS access for the same cus-
inafter IEC Web Proforums].
7 See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, ET AL., Federal Telecommunica-
tions Law, 858 (1992) [hereinafter KELLOGG]. Incumbent lo-
cal exchange carrier ("ILEC") refers to carriers who served as
providers of local exchange services, including BOCs and in-
dependent telecommunications carriers. Id. See also LCI
CompTel Petition, 1. Applied herein, ILEC refers to any lo-
cal exchange carrier subject to the obligations of 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 (c), which imposes on ILECs the duty to negotiate with
competitors, permit network interconnection, provide access
to unbundled network elements, offer resale, notify intercon-
necting carriers of changes in network configurations, and
provide for physical or virtual collocation of equipment. Id.
Not included in the definition of ILEC are those ILECs with
less than 2% of subscriber lines who have received an exemp-
tion, suspension, or modification of § 251(c) pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 251(f). Id.
8 See NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 151 (13th Ed.
1998). Competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC") refers
to communications service providers who seek to compete on
a selective basis for local exchange service, long distance, In-
ternet, and various other entertainment services. Id. CLECs
are likely to lease and resell local loops from the ILEC at
wholesale rates. Id.
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1996). See also 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(4) (1996).
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tomer service and network management reasons
that ILECs do. 10 However, this dependence is ac-
centuated by CLECs' entry into the recently der-
egulated local exchange. As a result, many lack
the time and financial resources necessary to con-
struct a facilities-based communications network.
Unable to wait to begin before providing local ex-
change services, CLECs interconnect with the
ILEC's network and obtain access to its OSS. Un-
fortunately, CLECs' capacities to access an ILEC's
OSS have encountered impenetrable barriers
which further hamper local competition. " Ironi-
cally, these barriers also prevent regional Bell Op-
erating Companies' 2 ("RBOCs") from obtaining
authority to provide in-region, interLATA serv-
ices. '3
Two years after the passage of the 1996 Act, leg-
islators, 14 regulators, carriers, and other inter-
ested parties have become preoccupied with the
lack of effective competition in the local ex-
change.15 Such concerns appear well-founded
given the unlikelihood that local competition will
materialize if OSS remains to be subject to "delay,
dilution, and degradation of access."' 6
This Comment proposes that the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC") adopt a set of
rules governing CLEC access to OSS. First, the
FCC should require ILECs to measure all perti-
nent OSS services. Second, the FCC should estab-
lish a set of default performance benchmarks.
Third, the FCC must impose on ILECs monthly
reporting requirements. Lastly, the FCC must im-
pose penalties on those ILECs that fail to provide
nondiscriminatory access to OSS.
Part I of this Comment looks at the problems
1o See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 3-4.
11 See Carolyn Hirschman, Long in Coming: Issues Remain
Unresolved as Telecom Act's Second Anniversary Nears, TELEPH-
ONY, Jan. 12, 1998, at 52 [hereinafter Hirschman, Long in
Coming]. Competition in the local exchange market is pro-
gressing, albeit slowly. However, success depends on resolv-
ing serious problems, one of which is that "operations sup-
port systems still have many bugs." Id.
12 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(4) (West Supp. 1998).
13 See id. at § 271. To date no BOC has obtained author-
ity to provide in-region, interLATA services pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 271. . However, on December 31, 1997, a Federal
District CourtJudge in Texas held Section 271 to be uncon-
stitutional. Similarly, Senator McCain recently introduced
legislation in the form of Senate Bill 1766, which seeks to
repeal Section 271.
14 See Congress on Competition, TELECOMPETITION REPORT,
Feb. 26, 1998, at 3. Ten Members of the House of Represent-
atives submitted statements in the Congressional Record sup-
porting BOCs and blaming the FCC and CLECs for the lack
experienced by ILECs and CLECs in obtaining
nondiscriminatory OSS access. Part II justifies the
FCC's authority to regulate OSS. Part III analyzes
and recommends performance measurement
standards. Part IV recommends a reporting re-
quirement policy for the FCC to follow. Part V
recommends a method by which the FCC ought
to impose monetary and injunctive penalties for
not adhering to OSS access requirements.
I. THE NEED TO GUARANTEE PARITY
A. History of OSS
Telephone companies once employed large
staffs and kept warehouses of paper records to
monitor how telephone services were ordered,
provided, maintained and repaired.1 7 In the
1970s and 1980s specialized computer systems, re-
ferred to as operations support systems, were in-
troduced to automate those functions and reduce
labor costs.1 8
The history of telecommunications leading up
to the passage of the 1996 Act is characterized by
the monopolization of the local exchange by a
sole service provider which was not required to
open its network to interconnection.' 9 As a re-
sult, OSS were designed specifically for an ILEC's
sole use.20 Over time technological developments
led to improvements in OSS. However, the lack
of OSS technological standards meant that ILECs
were free to choose whether or not to install up-
grades.21 As a result, countless OSS systems have
been developed that are both ILEC-and-service-
specific, and not universally implemented by
of competition in the local exchange market. Id.
15 See Hirschman, Long in Coming, supra note 11, at 52.
16 See Comments of Association for Local Telecommuni-
cations Services ("ALTS") to the LCI Comptel Petition, RM
9109, at ii (July 10, 1997). [hereinafter Comments of ALTS].
17 See AT&T Public Policy, OSS Interfaces and Competitive
Local Telephone Service, (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://
www.att.com/publicpolicy/oss.html>.
18 See id.
19 See generally KELLOGG, supra note 7, at § 1.1. Prior to
the 1986 Modified Final judgment ("MFJ"), both local and
long distance markets were monopolized by the Bell System.
Id. at § 1.7. The MFJ divested AT&T from Bell so that it may
provide long distance services. Id. MFJ then created seven
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOC" or "BOC")
from the old Bell System to serve as defacto monopoly local
service providers. Id.
20 See IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6.
21 See id. at § 3.
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ILECs nationwide.2 2 As the new entrants in the
local exchange, CLECs face the challenge of in-
terconnecting with the countless, complex OSSs
employed by ILECs nationwide. 23
B. Enter Local Competition
The 1996 Act intended to open the local ex-
change to competition. 24 Understanding that lo-
cal networks are not built overnight, Congress al-
lowed CLECs to interconnect with an ILEC's
network to provide services. Section 251 of the
1996 Act imposes interconnection requirements
on all local exchange carriers. 25 Section 251 (c),
however, imposes specific interconnection re-
quirements on ILECs. 26 Section 251(c) (3) re-
quires that ILECs provide CLECs nondiscrimina-
tory access27 to their network elements on an
unbundled basis.28 Unbundled network elements
("UNEs") may then be combined together with
either the ILEC's other services, or a CLEC's own
network elements.
Congress recognized that not all carriers would
have the equipment or capital to provide local
services via their own network facilities. 29 It there-
fore designated resale as the other method that
CLECs may employ to enter the local service. Sec-
tion 251(c) (4)30 requires ILECs to make their
services available to CLECs for resale purposes.3 1
Following the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC
22 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Sys-
tems Forum, 40 (1997). ILECs have developed OSS systems
that fail to work with CLECs' systems, but work well for its
own uses. Id.
23 See id. ILEC's proprietary interfaces are barriers to en-
try which raise costs and hinder efficiency. Id. Such inter-
faces also require a CLEC to develop multiple OSS computer
interfaces for different ILECs, and force them to develop the
capacity to alternate between those different interfaces. Id.
24 See Hirschman, Long in Coming, supra note 11, at 52.
25 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
26 See id. § 251(c).
27 See id. § 251(c)(3). Non discriminatory access to an
ILEC's network is often referred to as "parity." Parity infers
that the ILEC provides to the CLEC the same quality of ac-
cess to network elements and services that it provides itself.
28 See GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES, supra note 5, at U-1
(1997). Unbundling is the separation of communications
services that are associated with a larger service, i.e. un-
bundling operator and emergency services from the larger
local services package. Id.
29 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 117 (1996), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 128.
30 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(4) (1996).
31 See NEWFON's TELECOM DICIONARY, supra note 5, at R-
18. Owners of communications networks do not utilize all
the network's capacity. Id. Unused portions of the network
embarked on filling in the details. Most impor-
tantly, the FCC promulgated the Local Competition
Order which interpreted Section 251's intercon-
nection requirements to infer that OSS is one of
an ILEC's network elements to be made accessi-
ble through interconnection. In the Local Compe-
tition Order, the FCC subsequently listed those OSS
services that an ILEC must make available: specifi-
cally, information about "pre-ordering, ordering,




Pre-ordering is a multi-step process 33 during
which a CLEC accesses a customer service record
("CSR") that details the name and address of an
ILEC's customer. 34 The CSR also contains infor-
mation regarding specific services to which the
customer currently subscribes, and which addi-
tional services the end-user has not chosen to re-
ceive. This allows the CLEC to determine its mar-
keting strategy so that it may convince a potential
customer that it can offer a better array of services
at a better value. 3
5
A CLEC's pre-ordering success depends on two
factors. First, given that pre-ordering occurs while
the potential customer is on the line with the
CLEC's sales representative, the CLEC must be
able to access the CSR on a real-time basis. 36 Sec-
are offered to other carriers who purchase communications
services from the network's owner which are then resold to
additional customers. Id.
32 See In, re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996 and Interconnec-
tion Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mo-
bile Radio Service Providers, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
15754, para. 518 (1996).
33 Id. See also In re Application of Ameritech Michigan
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the State of
Michigan, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice, at A-5 (June 25,
1997) [hereinafter Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Ameritech MI].
"Ameritech provides five ... pre-ordering functions: cus-
tomer service record retrieval; telephone number selection
and reservation; due date selection and reservation; address
validation; and feature availability." Id. Together, the serv-
ices provide CLECs with the functionality to provide basic
services to end-users. Id.
34 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 9. Cus-
tomer Service Record ("CSR") refers to profiles of specific
customers that detail "name, billing and service addresses,
billed telephone numbers, and identification of features and
services on subscriber accounts." Id.
35 See id.at 6.,
36 See In. re Application of SBC Communications Inc. et
al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act
1998]
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ond, the CSR must be thoroughly accurate and
up-to-date.3 7 Otherwise, initiating and maintain-
ing communications is hindered by a lack of ac-
cess to accurate information which results in the
competitor not appearing as efficient as the
ILEC.3
8
Once the end-user agrees to change carriers,
the CLEC requests (i.e. "orders") the ILEC to
place the customer's service account in its
name. 39 The CLEC at this time also orders any
new services to be added to the customer's cur-
rent batch of services, and requests and obtains a
date for service initialization. 40 Ordering is pro-
vided via two distinct methods: manual and com-
puter interface. 4 1 While the problems of these
two methods also occur with pre-ordering, main-
tenance, and repair, their effects are felt the most
during the ordering process.
Manual processing is least favored. 42 Once pre-
ordering is complete, a CLEC normally transmits
via facsimile its order to the ILEC so that it may
enter the information into the OSS database.
of 1996 to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in the State
of Oklahoma, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Friduss Aff. at
10-11 (May 16, 1997). [hereinafter Dept. of Justice Evaluation
of SBC Communications OK].
37 See id.
38 See id. Pre-ordering is especially important given that
it is the first encounter between the CLEC and customer. Id.
39 See id. at 11. Ordering may also include database up-
dates pertaining to 911, directory listings, and repair, switch
updates, and dispatch of a technician. Id.
40 See id.
41 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Application of Amer-
itech MI, supra note 33 at A-9. Some orders received via auto-
mated interfaces are either reviewed or edited manually
prior to being processed by Ameritech's OSS. Id.
42 See id. at A-15 (stating that manual processing is the
weakest link in the chain of processing orders). Id.
43 See id. at A-16-A-17.
44 See id. at A-5.
45, See id.at A-18. "[D]elays leave CLECs in limbo vis-a-vis
their (potential) customers for significant periods of time,
whereas Ameritech retail representatives receive comparable
notifications of order errors almost immediately." Id.
46 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, 36, (1997). See also Problems With OSS Inter-
faces Again Stymie BellSouth in Efforts to Provide In-region In-
terlATA Services, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Feb. 9,1998,
at I [hereinafter Problems With OSS Interfaces]. The FCC de-
termined that BellSouth failed to provide CLECs information
regarding the status of their order that was substantially
equivalent to what it provided itself. Id.
47 See In re Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant
to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, As
Amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Mich-
igan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 Communications Reg.
(P&F) 267, 327 (1997) [hereinafter Application of Ameritech
MI]. Ameritech was incapable of processing all of a CLEC's
Once the relevant data is entered, the ILEC then
returns a form order confirmation ("FOC") to the
CLEC indicating that the service order was com-
pleted. 43 Manual OSS is fraught with problems,
including: lack of commitment by ILECs to match
its own human resources staffing needs with
CLEC increased order volume;44 time to commu-
nicate orders; 45 lost orders; processing time; and
human error.46 These problems are further com-
pounded as more orders are received, eventually
creating a vicious cycle 47 that, in the end, has neg-
ative repercussions on the CLEC's ability to con-
vince end-users that it can provide high quality lo-
cal services.
48
OSS access through an ILEC's computerized in-
terfaces is the preferred ordering method.
49
Computerized OSS involves two separate com-
puter interfaces, one between the ILEC and
CLEC,50 and another between the first interface
and the ILEC's OSS.51
Once established, the computerized interface
must be able to comply with the nondiscrimina-
orders in a timely manner because the "... increased order
volume triggered a simultaneous increase in the number of
orders requiring manual processing, which severely strained
Ameritech's available resources. Because Ameritech lacked
the resources to handle this increase, orders were backlog-
ged, delaying Ameritech's ability to deliver FOCs and order
rejection notices, and requiring Ameritech to modify the due
dates for those orders it was unable to process within the
time-frame defined by the requested due date." Id.
48 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, at 88-89. LCI terminated its initial local serv-
ices marketing campaign due to countless ordering problems
with its ILEC. LCI believed that continuing its local services
efforts with such obstacles would have a significant negative
effect on its reputation as a long distance carrier. Id.
49 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra
note 33, at A-2. Computerized OSS interfaces provide the
advantage of processing speed, storage information density,
and accuracy. Id.
5 See id. See also In re Application by BellSouth Corpora-
tion, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth
Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA
Services in South Carolina, Evaluation of U.S. Dept. ofJustice at
A-5 (Nov. 4, 1997). [hereinafter Application of BellSouth]
BOCs will need to automate the interaction of the interfaces
with their OSS as it will be "critical to the meaningful availa-
bility of resale services and unbundled elements." Id.
5' See Application of BellSouth, supra note 50, at A-4. The
term "flow through" describes the process in which an order
passes through the computer interface without any glitches
or rejections. See also Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note
46, at 1. The FCC rejected the 271 application partially be-
cause 97% and 81% of BellSouth's residential and business
orders, respectively, flow through its own OSS databases,
while only 40% of CLEC's customer orders flowed through
in August 1997 and 54% in September. Id.
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tory access standards of Sections 251 and 271 of
the 1996 Act. 52 However, carriers understand that
problems will accompany the implementation of
an automated OSS. 53 CLECs need not tolerate
the following problems which are representative
of the ills currently affecting local competition: in-
terface incompatibility; 54 late record reporting;
55
interfaces not being ready to support OSS re-
quests; 56 high rejection rates due to universal ser-
vice ordering codes ("USOCs"); 57 poor flow
through rates;58 and, lengthy ordering time inter-
vals.
59
The CLEC must be able to bill its customer in a
timely and accurate manner.60 To do so, the
ILEC must first deliver billing records to the
CLEC who then conveys its own bill to the cus-
tomer. The ILEC's billing records must be accu-
rate so that the CLEC can correct potential con-
flicts without adversely affecting customer service.
Billing errors are especially troublesome given
their effect on an end-user's perception of CLEC
service quality. Double billing is likely to result
where an ILEC does not update its OSS to indi-
cate that a specific end-user changed carriers. 61
Late or missed billing periods may also occur, es-
pecially where an ILEC sends inaccurate billing
records to the CLEC, the errors are corrected,
and then the end-user is billed.
6 2
The CLEC depends on the ILEC to monitor
services to determine if the services are opera-
tional and, where they are not, to repair them in a
timely fashion. 63 Other maintenance and repair
issues include the amount of time an ILEC re-
quires to make repairs and the frequency of such
52 See also Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note 46, at 1.
BOCs are obligated to provide automated communications
for OSSs and ensure that they are analogous to the BOC's
retail operations. Id.
53 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, at 78. OSS may appear perfect on the draw-
ing board but it is a guarantee that problems will ensue. Id.
But see id. at 119. CLECs are accepting automated systems'
imperfections "because the manual processing is not an ac-
ceptable alternative." Id.
54 See LCI ConpTel Petition, supra note 4, at 34.
55 See id. at 36.
56 See id. at 37.
57 See infra note 211. Generally, USOCs are the codes
used by an ILEC to identify services and features. The codes
subsequently appear on the customer service records that the
ILEC provides CLECs. Id.
58 See Problems With OSS Interfaces, supra note 46, at 1.
59 See, Comments of WinStar Communications, Inc., ")
to the LCI Comptel Petition, RM 9109 at 5 (July 10, 1997).
60 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 6.
troubles. 64
II. LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR FCC
ACTION ON OSS
A. FCC Has Congressional Authority to
Promulgate Rules on OSS
According to Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the FCC must have explicit or im-
plied authority from Congress to regulate access
to OSS.6 5 Based on the analysis detailed below,
the FCC has the requisite authority to require per-
formance measurement standards, reporting re-
quirements and impose penalties.
B. Title I
Congress delegated to the FCC broad authority
under Section 1 of Title I of the Act to regulate
interstate and foreign communications by wire
and radio. 66 Congress did this to ensure that a
national wire and radio network would make com-
munications services available to all people of the
United States. While communications originating
on the local exchange might appear intrastate in
nature, they often terminate across state bounda-
ries. This fact qualifies the call as interstate, and
thereby falls within the FCC's implied or express
authority under Section 151.67
C. Section 251
The 1996 Act demonstrates Congress' under-
61 See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech M, supra note
33, at n17. Double-billing is the most serious problem re-
lated to Ameritech's OSS. Id.
62 See Local Competition Users Group, Service Quality
Measurements, Version 6.1, 13 (Sept. 26, 1997). [hereinafter
LCUG Service Quality Measurements].
63 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 6.
64 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, at
10.
65 See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron requires a reviewing court
to (1) determine if Congress spoke on the issue of the
rulemaking and if so, (2) to determine whether the rule con-
tradicts Congress' express or implied intent. Id. If Congress
did not authorize the FCC to rule on OSS, the court consid-
ers whether the agency's rule is premised on a reasonable
construction of the statute., Id.
66 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-




standing that local exchange networks are not
built overnight. 6  Until they are, CLECs seeking
to offer telecommunications services may inter-
connect with an ILEC to resell the ILEC's services
or combine its own services with an ILEC's Un-
bundled Network Elements ("UNEs"). Section
251 promulgates the rules requiring ILECs to in-




Section 251 (c) (3) requires ILECs to provide a
requesting carrier "nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis."
'71 It
further requires that an ILEC provide UNEs "on
rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reason-
able, and nondiscriminatory.
'72
Section 251 (c) (4) imposes on an ILEC the duty
to make its network available for a CLEC to
repackage its services on a resale basis. 73
251(c)(4)(b) also precludes the ILEC from
prohibiting and imposing any "unreasonable or
discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the
resale of telecommunications service[s]." 74 The
FCC determined in the Local Competition Order
that OSS "fall squarely within the definition of
network element."75 The FCC also ruled that ac-
cess to OSS falls within the scope of indiscrimi-
nate access to resale services under 251(c) (4).76
While the Local Competition Order largely was
overruled in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC,7 7 the court
upheld the FCC's interpretation of Section 251 as
it applies to OSS.78 The court specifically noted
that the term "network element ' 79 includes "the
technology and information used to facilitate or-
68 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, paras. 6-15 (1996)
[hereinafter Local Competition Order].
69 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c) (4) (West Supp. 1998). "[N]ot to
prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory
conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommuni-
cations service." Id.
70 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c)(3) (West Supp. 1998). Stating
that there is a "[d]uty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." Id.
71 /d.
72 Id.
7 3 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (c)(4) (West Supp. 1998).
74 See id. § 251 (c) (4) (b).
75 Local Competition Order, supra note 68, at 15763.
76 Id. "We conclude that, under any of these interpreta-
tions, operations support systems functions are subject to the
nondiscriminatory access duty imposed by section 251 (c) (3),
and the duty imposed by section 251 (c) (4) to provide resale
services under just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms
dering, billing, and maintenance of phone service
- the functions of operational support systems."80
The court also supported the FCC's interpreta-
tion of the definition of "unbundled element."81
The court found that "information sufficient for
billing and collection" related to the "features,
functions, and capabilities" which are used in the
commercial offering of telecommunications serv-
ices to the public by computer software and hard-
ware that includes OSS.82
D. Section 271
The 1996 Act conditions Bell Operating Com-
pany (BOC) entry into interLATA on compliance
with Section 271 of the Act.8 3 There are two
methods of gaining 271 authority: 271(c) (1) (A)
and 271(c)(1)(B). Subsection (A) requires the
BOC to prove that it had not received any re-
quests for interconnection within three months
prior to requesting 271 authority.8 4 So far, the
FCC has yet to review an Section 271 application
under this option.
271(c)(1)(B) is the rule under which most
BOCs apply for 271 authority. A BOC must
demonstrate its compliance with the section's 14
point checklist to prove that it faces irreversible,
facilities-based competition in its region.
8 5
The following requirements taken from the
Section 271 checklist provide further proof that
the FCC retains authority over OSS. Section
271(c) (1) (B) (i) requires BOC compliance with
Section 251's interconnection requirements.
86
and conditions." Id.
77 See generally Iowa Ulil. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
1997).
78 See id. 120 F.3d at 808.
79 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(29) (West Supp. 1998). A 'network
element' is a "facility or equipment used in the provision of a
telecommunications service." Id. The term also includes
"features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by
means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber
numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information suffi-
cient for billing and collection." Id.
81) Iowa Util. Bd., at 808.
81 See id. at 809.
82 See id.
8-3 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1998).
84 See In re the Application of BellSouth Corporation, et.
al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications act of
1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services
in South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC
Rcd. 539, 543 (1997). [hereinafter Application of BellSouth SC
85 See id.
86 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (c) (2) (B) (i) (West Supp. 1998).
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Section 271(c) (1) (B) (ii) requires provision of
nondiscriminatory access to network elements ac-
cording to Section 251(c)(3).8 7  Section
271(c) (1) (B) (xiv) requires proof of indiscrimi-
nate access to resale facilities, which thereby re-
quires access to OSS. Lastly, as indicated immedi-
ately below, the FCC has authority subsequent to
Section 271 (d) (6) to penalize BOCs via fines and
injunctive relief for not complying with both 251
and 271 obligations.
Prior to providing in-region interLATA service,
a BOC must demonstrate its compliance with the
relevant state public utilities commission
("PUC"), Department of Justice, and FCC. Both
the PUC and Department of Justice then issue re-
ports which the FCC may consider, but need not
depend, in writing its final order. 88 In conclu-
sion, the FCC's 271 jurisdictional obligations indi-
cate that it retains authority to require compli-
ance with default performance measurements,
reporting requirements, and impose penalties for
not providing parity to OSS.
E. FCC Authority to Penalize for Lack of
Compliance
The FCC retains jurisdiction throughout the
Act to penalize ILECs who do not comply with
their obligation to provide access to OSS on non-
discriminatory, equal basis. Generally speaking,
the FCC may invoke Section 205 to issue a "cease
and desist" order against ILECs for violating the
interconnection requirements in Sections 251
and 271.89 Section 205 further permits the FCC
to levy a fine of $12,000 for each of those of-
fense.90 For reasons set out in Section V of this
Comment, this option is not deemed to be the
most effective measure, as an ILEC with consider-
able market power is likely to consider the fine to
As noted above, FCC retains jurisdiction over interconnec-
tion between carriers for resale services and UNEs as re-
quired by Section 251. See supra notes 69-82.
87 See id. § 271(c) (1) (B) (ii) (1997). As noted above,
under Section 251 OSS is inherently involved in interconnec-
tion for UNEs and resale services. Id.
88 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271(d) (2) (A) and(B) (West Supp.
1998).
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1994).
90 See id. § 205 (b).
91 Seeid. §503(b)(1)(A).
be the cost of doing business. For example, how
much negative financial impact can a $12,000 fine
have on a carrier who is eroding another's market
statute; even if it is via unsavory tactics?
The FCC may also invoke Title V to levy more
stringent fines against ILECs if the FCC deter-
mines after notice and a hearing that an ILEC
willfully or repeatedly violated the terms of its li-
censing authority,91 or any provisions of the Act.92
As a result the FCC may impose fines up to
$100,000 for each violation. However, the fine for
a continuing violation may not exceed
$1,000,000. 93
Where BOCs are hindering a CLEC's 0SS ac-
cess, it is more likely that the FCC will invoke Sec-
tion 271 (d) (6) to assess penalties.94 The FCC
may, after notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing, apply either one of the following two options:
order the deficiency corrected or penalize the of-
fending BOC under Title V; or, suspend or revoke
the BOC's in-region interLATA service author-
ity.
95
Section 271 (d) (6) emphasizes Congress' con-
cern that BOCs may use their in-region market
power to discriminate against a competitor in pro-
viding interconnection access. 271(d)(6) there-
fore serves as the FCC's stick to maintain order in
the local exchange.
In The Second Order on Reconsideration the FCC
asserted that it did not anticipate the need for any
immediate enforcement action against ILECs who
are making good faith efforts to comply with their
nondiscriminatory access requirement.96 How-
ever, the FCC did not preclude the initiation of
FCC enforcement "where circumstances war-
rant. '97 Clearly, ongoing discriminatory access to
OSS appear to be the circumstances under which
the FCC should establish the framework from
which any enforcement ought to take place.
92 See id. § 503(b)(1)(B).
93 See id. § 503(b) (2) (B).
94 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271 (d) (6) (West Supp. 1998). This
section provides that the FCC has ongoing oversight of a
BOC offering interLATA service. Id.
95 See id. § 271 (d)(6)(A).
96 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Or-






A. Pros & Cons of Performance Measurement
Standards
There is an old Bell system saying: "if you can
measure it, you can manage it."98 CLECs, 99
PUCs, 10 0  Department of Justice, 10 1 and the
FCC 112 all have asserted the importance of per-
formance measurement requirements. Given that
the FCC has yet to grant a BOC Section 271 li-
censing authority, 0 3 it would appear that they too
would recognize the role that performance mea-
surement standards would play in demonstrating
compliance with Section 271.104
ILECs, however, do not look favorably on fed-
eral regulations requiring them to measure access
to OSS. In one sense it would be an additional
function that their OSS might not be able to han-
dle.10 5 In another, performance measurement
standards would be a redundant regulatory bur-
den.10 6 Some ILECs consider performance mea-
98 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 1 (July 10,
1997).
99 See Comments of WinStar Comm., Inc., supra note 59,
at 3. "The Commission also should initiate a rulemaking pro-
ceeding to set minimum uniform performance standards for
OSS, and impose penalties for failure to meet those stan-
dards." Id.
100 See In re Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Com-
mission's Own Motion into Monitoring Performance of Op-
erations Support Systems, California Public Utilities Commis-
sion R.97-10-016, at 6 (Oct. 9,1997) [hereinafter CPUC R.97-
10-016]. It would be difficult to determine whether Pacific
Bell should be authorized to offer in-region interLATA serv-
ices without data to determine whether its OSS are function-
ing properly. Id.
101 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Communications
OK, supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 6. Detecting discrimination
in provision of OSS services depends on establishing per-
formance measures. Id.
102 See Application of Ameritech MI, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, supra note 47, at 330. The FCC must have a
proper factual basis to determine whether a BOC is supply-
ing nondiscriminatory access to all of its OSS functions. Id.
103 Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 2-3. Stating that
additional reasons for ILECs is the avoidance of repeated
complaints and subsequent lawsuits. But cf Opposition Com-
ments of GTE Service Corporation Comments to the Request
for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 3-4 (July 10, 1997). (As-
serting that ILECs are already subject to performance mea-
surements through interconnection agreements). Id.
104 Dept. of Justice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra note
33, at 35. Ameritech admits that it needs "concrete, detailed
performance standards and benchmarks for measuring
Ameritech's compliance with its contractual obligations and
impos[ing] penalties for noncompliance." Id.
105 See Opposition Comments of GTE Service Corp. to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 12-13 (July 10,
surement standards discriminatory. 10 7
The beneficial value of performance measure-
ment standards outweigh any asserted negative as-
pects. First, detecting discrimination in comply-
ing with OSS access requirements depends on the
establishment of performance measurements. 108
Second, in the case of BOCs complying with Sec-
tion 271 after having received in-region, in-
terLATA authority, measurements quantify
whether the BOC continues to provide nondis-
criminatory access.'0 9 Third, measurements en-
able CLECs and ILECs to "request, monitor and
implement interconnection."' 1 0 Lastly, measure-
ments enable carriers, regulators and customers
to review and predict industry trends.111
B. Differences Between UNE and Resale
1. Description of the Services
The Act anticipates three methods through
which local services will be provided: resale, un-
1997). [hereinafter Opposition Comments of GTE Service
Corp.]. (Explaining that measurement systems do not exist
for services provided to CLECs since there was no need to
provide them in the past). Id. But see Teleport Comm. Group,
supra note 1, at 2. Asserting that ILECs monitor their own
performance in critical areas, PUCs require ILECs to submit
service quality data in regular reports, and the FCC requires
BOCs and other ILECs to file performance measurements
for its annual report, "Quality of Service for Local Operating
Companies Aggregated to the Holding Company Level." Id.
106 See Opposition Comments of GTE Service Corp.,
supra note 105, at 13. See also Comments of Bell Atlantic and
Nynex to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 5
(July 10, 1997) (noting that interconnection agreements be-
tween parties, which are mediated and arbitrated by PUCs,
contain rigorous performance measurement standards). Id.
107 See Comments of Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and South-
western Bell Telephone Co. to the Request for Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 9-10 (July 10, 1997). ILECs may not be able
to meet the standards for the services that they provide for
their own use. Also, the standards will not likely permit ex-
ceptions for lapses caused by "natural disasters, work stop-
pages, periods of great demand, or weekends or holidays,"
and because resources are finite. Id.
108 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Communications
OK, supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 7.
109 See In re Application by BellSouth Corp., BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc. and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Provi-
sion of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, Evalua-
tion of U.S. Dept. of Justice, at 38 (Dec. 10, 1997). [hereinafter
Dept. of Justice Eval. of BellSouth LA].
I10 Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 4. Perform-
ance measurement standards enable carriers to determine if
they are receiving nondiscriminatory access, and if so, to con-
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bundled network elements, and construction of
one's own network. 112 Unless one CLEC is pro-
viding interconnection to another CLEC, the
third option does not apply to this discussion.
Resale occurs where CLECs purchase the same
packages of services that the ILEC provides to its
own customers. 11 3 The CLEC then labels those
services under its own name.1 4 Resale, therefore,
provides little product differentiation in a com-
petitive market.11 5 It is therefore deemed to be a
transitory measure to be used until interconnec-
tion via UNEs and facilities-based networks are
further developed. 16
Service providers who either cannot, or choose
not to provide services via their own network may
augment their service provision capacity by ac-
quiring an ILEC's UNEs. 117 The CLEC either ac-
quires all of its services on an unbundled basis, or
combines the ILEC's UNEs with its own.'1 8 The
CLEC must, however, present the mixture as one
package to a customer.' ' 9 While the end result
appears seamless in the customer's eyes, UNE ser-
vice provision is complex, prone to errors, and
subject to ILEC discriminatory business practices
which are likely to affect the way an end-user per-
ceives the CLEC's performance quality.1 20 As a re-
sult, a separate set of measurements are required
for UNEs.
112 See Local Competition Order, at 15509-15510.
113 See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 1. Resellers
of local services merely "rebrand" the underlying carrier's
services with their own name, while facilities-based carriers
differentiate their services through quality of service pro-
vided via state-of-the-art technology, distinct and customized




116 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 28. "Re-
sale ... is a limited interim vehicle to check the existing mo-
nopoly power of the LECs". Id.
117 See Local Competition Order, at 15509-15510.
118 See id.
119 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 8.
120 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 29 (arguing
that the FCC should be aware that the UNE platform is still a
complete unknown given its inherent complexities).
121 Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 1. See also LCUG
Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62, app. A at 56. For
example, resale services requiring measurement include: res-
ident POTS, Business POTS, Resident ISDN, Business ISDN,
Centrex/Centrex-Like, PBX trucks, Channelized T1.5 ser-
vice, and other resold services. Id. UNE services requiring
measurement include: UNE platform, UNE channelized
2. Recommendation
The FCC must recognize the differences be-
tween UNEs and resale. 121 It should therefore es-
tablish separate measurement requirements for
the two services. It is also justified by the signifi-
cant, future impact UNE's will have on the devel-
opment of the local exchange.' 22 Lastly, measur-
ing both will allow interested parties to determine
which is a more efficient path towards a CLEC's
future growth. This in turn results in a more com-
petitive local exchange.
C. Recommending What To Measure
The FCC must consider what ILECs will be re-
quired to measure. Generally, the purpose of per-
formance measurements is to quantify the quality
and reliability of OSS.123 Quality is measured by
time intervals which measure how long an activity
takes to complete.1 24 Reliability determines how
well the activity is performed, and if it needs to be
repeated.1 2 5  However, performance measure-
ments do not indicate the quality of OSS access.
Instead, they solely provide a yardstick to be used
in measuring against the pertinent service quality
benchmarks.1 26
DS1, unbundled DSO loop, unbundled DS1 loop, other un-
bundled loops, unbundled switches, other UNEs. Id. Com-
pare ALTS Service Quality Measurements, Version 1.0, app. A, at
28 (December 9, 1997), which adds the following items to
the LCUG list: ISDN basic rate, ISDN primary rate, unbun-
dled DS3 loop, network interface device, direct inward dial-
ing, remote call forwarding for ported numbers, signaling
system 7. See also Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 3.
ILECs should further be required to distinguish between ana-
log and digital circuits, specifically because CLECs are more
likely to employ the greater-capacity-carrying digital loops in
an effort to distinguish its services. Id.
122 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 29. The ap-
plication of UNEs provide a middle ground between facili-
ties-based competition and resale and provides a facilitated
path toward the former. Id.
123 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff. at 7.
124 See id. at 8. This can be an objective measurement
that measures the percentage of orders completed within a
certain time period, or it can be concrete and indicate the







The FCC should require ILECs to measure pre-
ordering for quality and reliability. Quality inter-
vals may measure either the specific or average
time required for CLECs to obtain pre-order in-
formation.' 27 Time intervals will also allow a com-
parison to be made against the ILEC's OSS access
to show whether the CLEC has an equal opportu-
nity to deliver a comparable customer experi-
ence. 128 Pre-order reliability will demonstrate the
"accuracy and completeness" of the data re-
ceived. 12
9
2. Ordering and Provisioning
There are three measurement categories in-
volved with ordering and provisioning. The aver-
age completion interval demonstrates the time re-
quired to deliver "integrated and operable service
components requested by the CLEC, regardless of
whether service resale or unbundled network ele-
ments are employed.' 3°1 The FCC ought also to
require an ILEC to measure the percentage of or-
ders completed on time.13' Second, ordering and
provisioning reliability measurements determine
the "accuracy and completeness" of the response
127 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8. See also Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK,
supra note 36, Friduss Aff. at 12. Intervals demonstrate OSS
response times which allow a customer representative to
complete the order while on the phone with the customer.
Id. Cf Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that
pre-ordering measurements should determine if the ILEC
provides access within 20 seconds). Id.
128 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8.
129 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff. at 12.
130 See ALTS: Service Quality Measurements, supra note 121,
at 13. See also Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff., at 13. Average completion interval
measures response times for notification of order comple-
tion, jeopardy, and rejection. Id.
131 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 8. Percent orders on time and average completion interval
may contribute to determining matters related to ILEC net-
work capacity. Id.
132 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aff., at 13. See also LCUG Service Quality Mea-
surements, supra note 62, at 9. Average response times may
also be used to indicate order status. Id. Additional status
measurements allow CLECs to determine: the average inter-
val for order rejections; a firm order confirmation (FOC) to
indicate that an order has been completed; the average jeop-
ardy interval to determine how long it took to transmit notice
to orders.13 2 The third performance measure-
ment relates to the percentage of orders that
"flow-through" from the CLEC service representa-
tive to completion where no ILEC technician in-
terrupts the order's path between interfaces.
33
3. Maintenance & Repair
Performance quality measurements for mainte-
nance and repair are key given their visibility to
the end-user.' 3 4 For example, a customer is likely
to have to cancel other obligations to be present
to receive a telephone service repairman. Any tar-
diness or missed service dates would therefore be
especially burdensome on the customer, who is
more likely to blame the CLEC who provides
him/her services than the underlying ILEC.
Quality of repair measures the interval between
when the end-user reports the need for repairs,
and the subsequent notification of completion. 
35
Repair reliability measures the quality of the re-
pair by indicating the frequency of network.'
36
Other repair measurements that may be consid-
ered relate to whether repair commitments are
met according to the established benchmark. 1
3 7
that a FOC could not be processed as initially ordered by the
CLEC; the percent ofjeopardies returned; the average inter-
val that an order is held beyond the promised order comple-
tion date. Id.
133 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 13. See also Problems With OSS Interfaces
supra note 46, at 1. While BellSouth made improvements in
its flow-through rates, a 60% disparity of order flow-through
rates between ILEC and CLEC order was of particular con-
cern to the FCC given that the services ordered were simple
resale orders. Id.
134 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 14. Given end-user dependence on
communications services and the likelihood that they will
have to take time away from other daily chores to be at the
site where repairs are made, tardiness and frequent troubles
are especially troublesome. Id.
135 See id. at 15. See also LCUG Service Quality Measure-
ments, supra note 62, at 10. There is a correlation between
time required to correct a service problem and customer dis-
satisfaction. Id.
136 See id. at 10 (noting that frequency of service repair
can also indicate the quality of the ILEC's network). Id. See
also Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 10 (adding that
other items to be measured may include the proportion of
time that an ILEC-installed facility requires repair within the
30 days of the last repair). Id.
137 See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 10.
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4. Billing Measurements
Billing performance measurements detail the
"speed, accuracy, and completeness" of ILEC-pro-
vided billing data.1 38 Quality measurements de-
tail the average or specific time required to gen-
erate recorded usage records, and the average
time to deliver the invoices to the CLEC 1 39 Relia-
bility of billing measures the percent of invoice
and usage accuracy. 140 This is especially impor-
tant as inaccuracies result in incorrect charges be-
ing paid which result in damage to either the end-
user's bottom line, the CLEC's, or both.
141
5. UNE-Specific Measurements
CLECs employ individual and combinations of
UNEs to provide competitive local exchange serv-
ices. It is essential, therefore, that the ILEC-pro-
vided UNE function properly to ensure that
CLECs can combine network elements and pro-
vide a seamless array of services to end-users.
142
The only way to guaranty that capacity is through
monitoring of UNE access as provided by ILECs.
6. Recommendations
ILECs must measure all factors involved in mak-
ing unbundled services appear seamless. UNE
performance measurement standards must there-
fore be measured and reported with the various
functions to which they are combined.1 43 For ex-
ample, measurements must indicate the intervals
at which combined network elements are con-
nected.1 44 ILECs must also measure timed re-
sponses to network errors which lead to service
degradation.1
45
138 See Dept. of Justice Evaluation of SBC Comm. OK, supra
note 36, Friduss Aft., at 7.
139 See LCUG Service Quality Measurements, supra note 62,
at 13. ILECs obtain an "artificial" competitive advantage




142 See id. at 52.
143 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 8. Other
unbundled network elements include white pages, E911, and
number portability. Id.
144 See id. See also id. at 9. Lack of parity in one of the
unbundled elements will likely hinder the appearance of the
CLEC's in the eyes of the end-user. Id.
145 See id. at 9.
146 See NEWrON's TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at
678. A loop typically refers to a complete electrical circuit.
ILECs must measure all unbundled loops146 ob-
tained by each individual CLEC. 1 47 This there-
fore requires the ability to track all categories of
each unbundled loop for each carrier. 48 The
FCC ought also to require ILECs to differentiate




The obligation to measure all relevant OSS
services need not be permanent. The FCC may,
in the future, reward ILEC compliance with OSS
performance measuring and reporting require-
ments by tempering the obligation. In the case of
performance measurement requirements, the
FCC may reduce the number of services or meth-
ods by which they are measured. As discussed in
Section IV of this Comment, the frequency of
monthly reporting requirements may be reduced
as deemed appropriate.
D. Creating Benchmarks for Performance
Measurement Standards
Benchmarks are the standard against perform-
ance measurements are compared to determine
if CLECs receive OSS access at the same level that
an ILEC provides to itself. As indicated below,
three parties may establish benchmarks: ILEC,
FCC, or PUC. The determination of whose
benchmarks are applied, however, essentially de-
pends on whether the relevant ILEC provides rea-
sonable standards against which its OSS provision
is to be measured.1 5
0
But the loop can also refer to the wires that connects the
ILEC's central office and the end-user's premises. Id.
147 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 10.
148 See id. This includes loop intervals, number portabil-
ity, etc. See also ALTS: Service Quality Measurements, supra note
121, app. A, at 28. Additional services include: ISDN Basic
Rate; ISDN Primary Rate; Unbundled DS3 Loop; Network In-
terface Device; Direct Inward Dialing; Remote Call Forward-
ing for Ported Numbers; Signaling System 7; and interim
number portability. Id.
149 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 16, at 8. It is im-
practical for ILECs to assert that 90% of UNEs are provided
at nondiscriminatory intervals if half of the carriers with
which it interconnects do not access the same services. Id.
150 See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp. to the Re-
quest for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6 July 10, 1997).
[hereinafter LCI Int'l Telecom Corp. Comments].
1998]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
1. ILECS May Provide Their Own Benchmarks
ILECs inability to provide their own 0SS per-
formance measurement standards has been a pri-
mary reason for the initiation of the FCC's ongo-
ing OSS rulemaking' 5' and 271 application
rejections. 5 2 The FCC nonetheless ought to rec-
ognize an ILEC's potential to further develop its
own standards for measuring access to OSS.'
53
Such standards must, however, be reasonable.
154
2. Where Not Provided By an ILEC, The FCC Will
Establish Default Standards
The FCC ought to establish its own benchmarks
where an ILEC does not provide its own.' 5 5 Such
standards would serve as default provision either
where the ILEC does not provide information or
its measurements are inadequate. 5 6  Given a
PUC's role in arbitrating interconnection agree-
ments,' 5 7 the FCC should recognize that its stan-
dards ought to reflect a minimal level of parity. 1
58
This in turn will provide states with an opportu-
nity to fully adopt the FCC's standards, or enable
them to model their own OSS measurements stan-
dards.' 5
9
In establishing its default benchmarks, the FCC
should avoid developing numerically static, inflex-
ible performance measurement standards.1 60 In-
151 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 30. Not one
ILEC met the Section 251 interconnection obligation of pro-
viding nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Id.
152 See Dept. ofJustice Eval. of BellSouth LA, supra note 109,
at 31-32. DoJ examines whether BOC established perform-
ance standards demonstrate a BOC's commitments to meet
specified levels of performance and performance. In both its
Louisiana and South Carolina Section 271 applications Bell-
South failed to provide sufficient performance measure-
ments to make a determination of parity in the provision of
resale and UNEs. Id.
153 See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note
150, at 6.
154 See id.
155 See id. Compare Comments of California Public Utili-
ties Comm'n ("CPUC") to the Request for Comments in DA No.
97-1211, at 7 Jul. 9, 1997), with Comments of Nat'l
Telecomm. and Info. Admin. ("NTIA"), to the Request for
Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 2 (Aug. 12, 1997), and Com-
ments of Wisconsin Public Service Comm'n, to the Request for
Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 5 (Jul. 9, 1997).
156 See Comments of LCl Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note 150,
at 6.
157 See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 2. The Act
mandates that both state and federal regulators oversee the
development of OSS functions. Id.
158 See id. at 7-8. Detailed standards would tax FCC re-
stead, the FCC's benchmark system must remain
flexible to accommodate persistent improvements
in OSS technology and marketplace pressures. 61
Benchmarks should also permit lapses in parity
due to environmental occurrences, labor strikes,
system upgrades, etc. 16 2  Moreover, the FCC
should establish a biennial review of the
benchmarks to alter the system as necessary.
3. States May Establish Their Own Standards
Pursuant to Section 252(B) (4) (c), PUCs are re-
sponsible for arbitrating differences between in-
terconnecting service providers.' 63 States there-
fore have a unique role in ensuring the
development of effective local competition. The
history of local service provision infers that PUCs
have a developed understanding of an ILEC's
methods of doing business, and their networks'
capacities. 164 State regulatory agencies should be
able to look at the FCC's default benchmarks and
determine whether or not more detailed stan-
dards are necessary. 165 If so, PUCs can thus deter-
mine which standards are most applicable to the
development of the local exchange in their juris-
diction.1
66
States must, however, recognize that imposing
benchmarks which are too strict will have a signifi-
sources, and the notice and comment process might pre-
clude states from initiating their own OSS rulemaking pro-
ceeding. Id.
159 See id.
160 See Comments of Teleport Comm. Group ("TCG") to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 2 (ul. 10,
1997). See also id. at 4. The Act and the FCC's interpretation
of it indicate that parity is a flexible standard that the FCC
should not try to set in stone. Id.
161 See id. Cf Comments of Wisconsin Public Service
Commission, to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211,
at 3 (Jul. 9, 1997) (arguing that standards ought to reflect the
fact that OSS "access has never been provided before and it is
literally impossible to create a defect-free information ex-
change system overnight"). Id.
162 See Comments of Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and South-
western Bell Telephone Co. to the Request for Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 9-10 (Jul. 9, 1997).
163 See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 6.
164 See Comments of NTIA, supra note 155, at 2.
165 See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 8. See also
Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note 150, at 6.
166 See Comments of NTIA, supra note 155, at 2. See also
Comments of Competitive Policy Institute ("CPI") to the Re-
quest foi Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6 (Jul. 10, 1997).
States should be able to adopt OSS standards that are more
stringent than the FCC's. Id.
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cant adverse impact on local competition.1 67 Un-
reasonable standards will prevent BOCs from
demonstrating nondiscriminatory access to its
OSS functions.' 68 As a result, one state's unrea-
sonable requirements will make it more difficult
for a BOC to obtain 271 licensing authority than
other states nationwide.1 69 The FCC should
therefore be attentive to this possibility and recog-
nize the probability of preempting state authority
where it prevents local competition.
70
IV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
In the Second Order on Reconsideration of the Lo-
cal Competition Order, the FCC held that an ILEC
must provide an interconnecting CLEC the OSS
interface design specifications that it uses to pro-
vide OSS to itself.171 The FCC did not, however,
build on this reporting requirement, and thus left
open the issue of whether an ILEC would be re-
quired to report on its provision of access to OSS.
A. The Purpose of Reporting Requirements: A
Need for Disclosure
ILECs are hesitant to disclose information re-
garding compliance with OSS nondiscriminatory
access standards. 7 2 Until the passage of the Act,
ILECs had a monopoly on local service. 173 With
the passage of the Act, the monopoly has been re-
duced to mere dominant market power.' 74 This
slide may forecast even greater market loss as lo-
cal exchanges eventually become competitive. It
is therefore natural that an ILEC would want to
do whatever it can to maintain its place in the
market, prevent CLECs from taking its customers,
and also obtain authority to offer in-region in-
167 See Comments of CPUC, supra note 155, at 8-9.
168 See id.
169 See Comments of CPI, supra note 166, at 5-6.
170 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1998).
171 11 FCC Rcd. 19738, 19742 (1996).
172 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Sup-
port Systems Forum, at 36. Bell Atlantic required LCI to sign
a confidentiality order for all OSS performance standards. Id.
As a result, anything that LCI reported to a state utility com-
mission, Department of Justice, or the FCC would be under
seal and unavailable for the public's review. Id.
173 See id. at 72.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Sup-
port Systems Forum, at 72.
177 See Comments of LCI Int'l Telecom Corp., supra note
terLATA services. 1 7 5 If that means holding on to
reports measuring parity between services that an
ILEC offers to itself and the services that it pro-
vides to a CLEC, then so be it.
1
76
Reporting requirements serve as a monitoring
device to ensure compliance with ILEC measure-
ment obligations.17 7  Moreover, reporting re-
quirements ensure that carriers, the FCC, PUCs
and other interested parties have access to the
same set of OSS access information. This in turn
will guaranty that they all "speak the same lan-
guage" with regard to performance standards.
1 78
Reporting requirements benefit both PUCs and
the FCC by providing an invaluable resource to
determine if nondiscriminatory access is being
provided. The agency may also use these reports
as a standard when reviewing petitions for media-
tion179 or arbitration,18 0 or take corrective action
to remedy competitive problems disclosed by the
reports.181 Reports will also provide CLECs with
information basic to setting up its back-office' 82
monitoring systems to ensure that they are provid-
ing competitive local services. This information,
precludes a CLEC from collecting OSS access in-
formation from alternative sources which lack an
ILEC's first hand information.
18 3
Given the nature of a competitive industry, re-
ports indicating discriminatory access will alert
CLECs that their customers are receiving inferior
services compared to what other carriers provide.
CLECs may then quickly identify problems, alert
the ILEC, and hopefully arrive at a concerted so-
lution to the problem. If, however, such an ideal
resolution does not result, parties to the agree-
ment can file complaints with administrative




179 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (a)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
180 Seeid. at § 252 (b)(1).
181 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, app. A at 13.
182 See IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6, § 1. The term
"back office" refers to where a company performs general
business functions, regardless of the communications service
provided general functionsthat a company requires, regard-
less of the business, are performed. Id. For example, a ILEC's
back office contain its entire OSS database. Id. Front office
refers to the part of the business that deals with customer
operations. Front office functions are frequently unique
based on the industry and/or service provided. Id.
183 See LCI CompTel Petition, supra note 4, at 9.
184 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 252 (West Supp. 1998). In general,
state regulatory agencies have authority over interconnection
19981
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Reporting requirements are beneficial to ILECs
as they provide them with a record from which
they can advocate their own case for 271 author-
ity, negotiate interconnection agreements, and
defend against complaints for lack of parity in
services. These reporting requirements will likely
pose a minimal burden on the ILEC.'8 6 0 SS al-
ready measure the ILEC's own services, and there-
fore should be able to provide the objective data
necessary to determine if parity is being provided
to a CLEC.'8 7 Even where reporting for specific
OSS services has been developed, OSS are large,
complex databases capable of performing such
added functions. 88
B. Interim Reporting Requirements
Two years after the Act's passage, CLECs re-
main new entrants to the local exchange. Their
marketplace presence is hindered by ILEC unwill-
ingness to disclose vital OSS information, 189 and
they lack alternative sources to get such informa-
tion.' 9°1 Interim reporting requirements provide
CLECs an initial source of reference until reports
can be provided on a regular basis.'91 Interim re-
ports also facilitate future compliance monitoring
the FCC, PUCs, ILECs, and CLECs can refer to
them when circumstances require.
1. Recommendation for Interim Reporting
Requirement
The FCC should require ILECs to provide to
the FCC, PUCs, and CLECs with whom they inter-
connect an interim report describing: 1) all OSS
functions currently measured; 192 2) benchmarks
they adhere to; 3) performance measurement
standards being developed; 4) and, how current
agreements. Id.
185 See id. at § 252(e)(5). The FCC has authority over in-
terconnection agreements where the PUC fails to act. Id.
186 See Teleport Comm. Group, supra note 1, at 16.
187 See id. Cf Opposition Comments of GTE Service




191 Cf Comments of AT&T Communications Corpora-
tion ("AT&T") to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211,
at 8 Uuly 10, 1997).
192 See id. at 19. See also Comments of WinStar, supra
note 59, at 3.
193 See id.
194 See In re Applications of NYNEX Corporation and Bell
and future performance standards will be mea-
sured.'
93
Under this scheme the ILEC could optimally
provide any information specifically dealing with
manual OSS services. Such information would
demonstrate to all interested parties the negative
impact that manual OSS has on a CLEC's capacity
to enter the local exchange. This information
would also provide the ILEC the opportunity to
demonstrate its commitment to improving access
to OSS as it eventually replaces manual service
providers with electronic interfaces.
C. Permanent Reporting Requirements
Like interim reports, the FCC should require
ILECs to provide reports to the CLEC, FCC, PUC,
and ILEC itself on a monthly basis.' 94 The FCC
and relevant PUC should thereafter make the re-
port available to the general public. This guaran-
tees that everyone with a vested interest in the de-
velopment of a competitive local exchange will
have the information necessary to monitor parity
for OSS. However, reports to CLECs should spec-
ify performance information for that carrier only,
but still report on other CLECs in a generalized,
non-descriptive manner. 9 5
1. Time Frame for Initiating Monthly Reporting
Requirements
A CLEC ought to begin receiving reports within
90 days after signing an interconnection agree-
ment.19 6 After that, regular monthly reporting
ought to begin 197 which provides the CLEC with a
chart comparing the services it receives against: 1)
the OSS access that an ILEC's' 98 affiliate(s) re-
ceives; 2) the ILEC's ten largest retail customers;
Atlantic Corporation for Consent to transfer Control of
NYNEX Corp. and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 9 Comm. Reg. 187, Appendix C p. 257, (1997). [here-
inafter Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger].
195 See CPUC R. 97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A. See also
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C at 257.
196 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. See also CPUC R.97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A.
197 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. See also Comments of AT&T, to the Request for Com-
ments in DA No. 97-1211, at 20 (July 10, 1997). Compare with
Comments of TCG to the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-
1211, at Exhibit A (Jul. 10, 1997). Given that some ILECs still
do not believe that OSS is a UNE, it may be inferred that
monthly reporting requirements are not favored. Id.
198 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
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3) carriers purchasing interconnection in the ag-
gregate; 4) and, services and facilities provided to
individual carriers purchasing interconnection. 99
2. Recommendations for the Future
The FCC ought to consider building future
flexibility into the monthly reporting require-
ment.2 0 0 It may permit both the ILEC and CLEC
to build into their interconnection agreement a
relaxed reporting requirement that becomes ef-
fective after OSS parity standards have been met
over an extended period of time. Under this sce-
nario the ILEC would submit to the FCC and PUC
a petition for relief from reporting requirements
based on a thorough demonstration that a proven
track record of compliance with OSS access re-
quirements. The FCC would then issue a notice
of proposed rulemaking, and eventually issue a re-
port.
Similarly, once an ILEC establishes a proven
track record of nondiscriminatory OSS access,
PUCs may permit relaxed reporting requirements
to be built into interconnection agreements. This
relaxation would likely appear as an contractual
option to go into effect once the ILEC proves
compliance over time. Or, it could be imple-
mented according to the desires of the two con-
tracting parties.
app. C at 257. While the FCC requires a report within 90
days after the signing of the agreement, it recognizes that re-
ports for certain services may not be available by that time.
Id. See also CPUC R.97-10-016, supra note 100, app. A.
19 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194, app. C
at 257. Compare Comments of TCG, supra note 160, at Ex-
hibit 1.
200 See id.
201 See In re Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
App. C at 257. Id.
202 Id. But see Comments of Wisconsin Public Service Commis-
sion, supra note 155, at 3. Wisconsin does not believe a long
list is necessary, instead just proof that an ILECs intervals are
the same as the CLEC's. Id.
203 See In re Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, supra note 194,
app. C, at 257. However, a PUC may require more informa-
tion for its review of an application to obtain section 271 li-
censing authority, but may not require less than the FCC de-
fault for any other matter including monthly monitoring
reports. Id.
204 See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (West Supp. 1998). But see Appli-
cation of Ameritech MI, supra note 47, at 330. Carriers require
a great deal of information for their monitoring of parity in
OSS services. Id. Therefore, it is unlikely that a carrier would
initially want less information, but instead require more. Id.
Compare Comments of AT&T, supra note 191, to the Request
for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 20 (Jul. 10, 1997). As lo-
cal competition becomes firmly rooted, carriers, like the
D. Recommendations for the Content of the
Reports
The FCC should establish a default reporting
regulation requiring ILECs to provide a detailed
narration of all the numeric measurements within
the report.20 1 The report should also include de-
scriptive information defining which OSS services
are measured.20 2 Under this scenario, the ILEC
should be required to provide any information
20 3
that a PUC requires in addition to what is man-
dated by the FCC. Additionally, under Section
252, the PUC may allow carriers to contract be-
tween themselves to provide greater or lesser
amounts of information.
20 4
E. Reports Not Required on a Regular Basis
Given that ILECs' OSS are often designedto
their specific service requirements, 20 5 and the fact
that OSS are largely not subject to nationwide
technological standards, 20 6 CLECs are forced to
figure out how to interconnect with OSS that are
distinct from others with which they intercon-
nect.2 0 7 This often occurs on a service by service
basis, and also from state to state. 208
FCC, are likely to reduce their demands for information de-
tailing service intervals and concentrate on more appropriate
competitive concerns. Id.
205 See IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6, § 1. OSS were de-
veloped to accommodate the past static network configura-
tions of "one line, one number, hard wired, not many
changes." Id.
206 See Comments of WinStar, supra note 99, at 3 (noting
that "[o]f particular concern to Winstar is the fact that each
ILEC's OSS functions are not standardized"). Id. Cf Com-
ments of GST Telecom, Inc. to the Request for Comments in DA
No. 97-1211, at 12 (uly 10, 1997)( arguing that "[u]ntil
standardization is achieved, the Commission cannot establish
minimum national standards for the provision of access to
OSS by ILECs"). Id. See also Common Carrier Bureau Operations
Support Systems Forum, supra note 22 at 60. (asserting that we
absolutely need technical standards). Id. Note, this Comment
does not address the issue of standards, as it is a subject unto
itself.
207 IEC Web Proforums, supra note 6, at § 3. Today, tradi-
tional carriers must deal with "hundred of non or semi-inte-
grated systems, legacy core applications, and the demands of
the new competitive marketplace to provide competitive dif-
ferentiation through service delivery." Id.
208 Id. While service providers have similar core systems
to provide pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, mainte-
nance and repair, and billing, "literally thousands of applica-




The FCC must recognize the lack of technologi-
cal uniformity and require that ILECs report any
information related to their OSS hardware and
software configurations. 20 9 ILECs should be re-
quired to inform CLECs of any internal "business
rules,"2 10 especially information related to order-
ing codes and field identifiers.2 11 CLECs require
information describing the codes to ensure that
service initiation is not delayed due to a faulty or-
dering process.
212
The most appropriate FCC requirement would
place an affirmative obligation on an ILEC to pro-
vide to CLECs its "business rules concerning how
its internal systems and databases process an or-
der."2 1 3 Competition and technological advances
will likely further develop OSS capacity. 2 14 Any
such developments will likely affect any CLEC's
use of the systems. 215 The FCC should require
ILECs to report any and all alterations or develop-
ments to its business rules. This will ensure the
CLEC's ability to enter orders with the most up-to-
date codes, which will thereby preclude any possi-
bility of rejection resulting from ignorance.
In a similar manner, the FCC should require
ILECs to inform the CLEC of any changes made
to its hardware configurations. This argument as-
sumes that all interested parties will be informed
of industry standards. While standards may be de-
OSS and support new services." Id.
209 See Application of BellSouth South Carolina, supra note
84, at para. 114. High ordering error rates can be attributed,
to BellSouth's failure in "providing competing carriers with
information and support concerning the effective use of the
EDI interface."
210 See Application of Ameritech MI, supra note 47, at 310-
311. "Business rules" refer to protocols used by ILECs to
guaranty that orders are formatted in a uniform manner. Id.
An example would be a hardware command that prohibits
the resubmission of an order after it was initially rejected. Id.
211 See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech MA, supra note
33, App. A at 24. Universal service ordering codes ("USOCs")
and field identifiers ("FID") are the codes used by an ILEC to
identify services and features. Id. The codes subsequently ap-
pear on the customer service records that the ILEC provides
CLECs. Id. If a CLEC "cannot accurately identify the corre-
sponding services and features a customer currently receives,
the CLEC may not be fully aware of service-affecting ramifica-
tions of assuming service obligations for the customer or be
able to order services accurately." Id. See also In re Common
Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Forum, supra note 22
at 69-70. USOCs are difficult to interpret, as they are strings
of letters, which if you enter into the OSS interface incor-
rectly, even by one letter, the order is rejected. Id. See also In
re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support Systems Fo-
rum, at 70. USOCs differ for residential and business con-
veloped, alterations to those systems must be ex-
pected. A CLEC ought to apprised of any such
changes.
V. PENALTIES
Unless properly set penalty provisions are estab-
lished, OSS reporting and performance standards
will not provide ILECs with an incentive to com-
ply with Sections 251 and 271. As noted in Sec-
tion 11(d) of this Comment, the FCC retains am-
ple jurisdiction upon which to penalize ILECs for
not providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS
functions.2 16 Three alternatives exist for the FCC
to implement this policy: 1) abstain from regulat-
ing and allow penalties to be determined by inter-
connection agreements; 2) monetary penalties; 3)
injunctive penalties.
A. Abstention
The least active FCC policy would impose pen-
alties through carriers' interconnection agree-
ments. There are two reasons why this option is
.not viable. First, contractual negotiations have
not proved themselves to be an effective deter-
rence to discriminatory OSS access.217 Second,
ILECs retain market power that precludes any
sort of effective contractual, monetary penalty.218
sumers, further compounding the difficult situation already
faced by CLECs. Id.
212 See Dept. ofJustice Evaluation of Ameritech MI, supra note
33, at 310-311. See also, Application for BellSouth SC, supra note
84, at para. 111 "we find that the evidence reasonably sup-
ports a conclusion that some of the competing carriers' er-
rors were caused by Bell South's failure to provide business
rule and other pertinent information." Id.
213 Application for BellSouth SC, supra note 84, at para. 111.
214 See also In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Support
Systems Forum, supra note 22, at 58. Technology and con-
sumer demands will change over time and, as a result, there
will be a ongoing process through which OSS problems are
solved. Id.
215 See id.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 201-204.
217 See Comments of AT&T, supra note 191 at 25. "Contrac-
tual remedies are usually based on a percentage of the
ILEC's charges for specific network elements or services or
related support functions, and are too low to provide an ef-
fective incentive for the ILECs to act in a nondiscriminatory
manner." Id.
218 See In re Common Carrier Bureau Operations Sup-
port Systems Forum, at 72. The local exchange as it currently
exists does not resemble a normal commercial setting, in-
stead it is comprised of a monopoly powerhouse and a collec-
tion of smaller players. Id.
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If abstention were an effective approach, inter-
connection negotiations would provide CLECs
with nondiscriminatory access to OSS. However,
given the established need for performance mea-
surements, benchmarks, and reporting require-
ments, this is not the case.
219
B. Monetary Penalties
Over time, the FCC's capacity to impose mone-
tary penalties against ILECs220 has not been an
overly effective regulatory tool. As noted above,
powerful ILECs are not as likely to be financially
devastated by a financial penalty as would a CLEC.
Indeed, past experiences prove that fines and for-
feitures are institutionally difficult for the FCC to
assess and only moderately deter non-competitive
ILEC behavior.
221
1. Recommendation for Monetary Penalties
Should the FCC decide to impose fines, how-
ever, it should create self-executing sanctions
based on an ILEC's reports. 22 2 This approach
may be bolstered by establishing additional fines
for multiple or repeated failures. The FCC
should also apply this approach against ILECs for
submitting false or misleading data.
223
C. Injunctive Penalties
The FCC's authority under Section
271(d) (6)(iii) permits it to suspend or revoke a
carrier's authority to offer in-region interLATA
services. 224 While the scope of this authority is
daunting, requiring a carrier to stop providing in-
terLATA service to its customers would be an ex-
treme measure. 225  For example, human re-
sources devoted to planning, marketing, and
administering an ILEC's in-region, interLATA
219 See Comments of ALTS, to the Request for Comments in
DA No. 97-1211, at ii. The only local competition will materi-
alize is by establishing performance measurements, perform-
ance standards, and remedies. Compare Comments of GTE, to
the Request for Comments in DA No. 97-1211, at 6-7 (July 10,
1997). -ILECs are contractually obligated to meet intercon-
nection standards, and if not are liable for substantial mone-
tary damages. Id.
220 See 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1994). See generally 47 U.S.C.
§ 501-503 (1994).
221 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98 at 16.
222 See Comments of AT&T, supra note 191 at 26.
223 See id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994). FCC is au-
thorized to levy against common carriers fines of up to
program would be susceptible to FCC injunctive
authority.
1. Recommendation
Less intense measures exist. The FCC may al-
low the penalized ILEC to continue providing ser-
vice to customers that are already signed up and
receiving service, but remove an ILEC's authority
to accept new orders for interLATA service.
226
The FCC may impose fines for initial violations,
but then implement a sliding scale of fines and
injunctive relief with repeated violations. For ex-
ample, discriminatory OSS access over a two
month period may only result in fines.
If such problems persist, however, the fines may
increase in quantity, and eventually may be com-
bined with less restrictive injunctive relief, like
halting the signing up of new customers. Should
the problem continue, more stringent injunctions
may be imposed. Where discrimination is en-
demic, 271 authority should eventually be re-
scinded .227
CONCLUSION:
Before and during the reign of the Modified Fi-
nalJudgment, little was heard about the potential
for competition in the local exchange. The rapid
expansion of the market for long distance services
demonstrated just how profitable competition can
be for carriers and consumers alike. With the pas-
sage of time, the local exchange became seen as
the next untapped source for a boom in telecom-
munications. The passage of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 broke down the monopolistic lo-
cal services market and intended to open it up to
competition.
The Act essentially removed the barriers to en-
$100,000 per day for "willfully or repeatedly" violate the Act
or other relevant regulations. Id.
224 See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (6) (iii) (West Supp. 1998). See
also 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1994). See also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)
(1994). Allowing the FCC to enjoin non-BOCs from regu-
lated activities. Id.
225 See Comments of CPI, supra note 166, at 5-6. It is not
in the public interest to require the BOC to cease providing
interLATA services once it has obtained customers. Id.
226 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 16. See
Comments of CPI, supra note 160, at 12. Another reasonable
injunctive measure would be stopping the specific BOC from
marketing interLATA services to new customers. Id.
227 See Comments of ALTS, supra note 98, at 16.
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try into the local telecommunications markets. 228
Since then $14 billion has been invested in
CLECs, 2400 interconnection agreements have
been signed, and the combined local exchange
market is now valued at over $20 billion dollars. 229
However, that does not mean that local competi-
tion is as profitable or ubiquitous as it should be.
OSS remains one major reason why local com-
petition has not fully bloomed. ILECs are re-
quired by the Act to provide nondiscriminatory
access to their OSS. Unfortunately, because of
network design and anti-competitive business
practices, CLECs have yet to gain the access they
require to compete effectively.
Discriminatory OSS access is hindering CLECs
ability to compete in the local exchange. CLECs
cannot access customer service records to per-
form the pre-ordering necessary to market serv-
ices to customers. There are debilitating delays
involved with obtaining ILEC responses to CLEC
service orders. Even where services are properly
ordered, ILEC-supplied manual and automated
OSS substantially delay the provisioning process.
ILECs are also guilty of not attending to CLEC re-
quests for network maintenance as quickly as they
do for their own services. Nor are CLECs receiv-
ing accurate billing records in a timely fashion.
228 Press Statement of Chairman William E. Kennard on the
Second Anniversary of the Telecom Act of 1996 (Jan. 30, 1998)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/
The FCC must become involved in resolving
these problems. It must require ILECs to mea-
sure all OSS services for resale and UNEs. It must
also provide a reasonable set of default
benchmarks against which ILEC performance
measurements are compared. Secondly, the FCC
must require interim and then monthly reporting
requirements for monitoring ILEC compliance
with OSS service obligations. Lastly, where ILEC
compliance is not provided, the FCC must penal-
ize ILECs via a combination of monetary and in-
junctive relief.
The local exchange is not the only sector of the
communications industry experiencing massive
growth. Satellite deregulation, the implementa-
tion of the World Trade Organization's Agree-
ment on Basic Telecommunications Services,
wireless, and Direct Broadcast Satellite are all ma-
jor reasons for the communications industry's
outstanding growth. The FCC should continue to
seize upon this pro-competitive tendency and en-
sure that CLECs have the nondiscriminatory OSS
access they need to successfully provide competi-
tive local services.
stwek804.htrml>.
29 See id.
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